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14.1. Introduction 
Justice for colonial wrongs is a difficult matter. Collective or individual 
responsibilities have rarely been established in history.1 This may be de-
scribed as an ‘accountability gap’.2 While this gap may partly be due to 
circumstantial and factual reasons, it is also the result, specifically, of le-
gal impediments that are faced by victims in their quest for justice. Such 
impediments exist on the plane of international(ized) justice, at the level 
of former colonies, as well as in the domestic legal order of former colo-
nial States.  
This chapter takes the latter perspective as a starting point. Drawing 
from our experience in assisting victims of colonial crimes and their fami-
lies in Belgium, we will seek to examine the  ‘accountability gap’ from 
                                                   
*  Christophe Marchand, Crépine Uwashema and Christophe Deprez are all attorneys at 
JUS COGENS, a Brussels-based, small-size law firm specialising in human rights and in-
ternational criminal issues. Deprez is Associate Lecturer at the University of Liège and a 
Visiting Professor at the University of Lille and at Aix-Marseille University. He holds a 
Ph.D. from the University of Liège. Marchand qualified as an attorney in 1996 and is a 
partner at and founder of JUS COGENS. He has extensive experience in international 
criminal cases and in human rights litigation, including before the European Court of Hu-
man Rights and United Nations monitoring bodies. Uwashema is a partner at JUS CO-
GENS. She holds master’s degrees in law from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Universi-
té libre de Bruxelles.  
1  See Wolfgang Kaleck, Double Standards: International Criminal Law and the West, Torkel 
Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2015, p. i. See also, pointing at a few recent, do-
mestic attempts to address this issue, Morten Bergsmo, “Myanmar, Colonial Aftermath, 
and Access to International Law”, in Occasional Paper Series No. 9 (2019), Torkel Opsahl 
Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2019, pp. 17–18.  
2  See also Chapter 15 below by Mutoy Mubiala (“Addressing Colonial Wrong-Doing in the 
Great Lakes Region of Africa”). 
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the perspective of the criminal law and practice of a former colony. We 
will do so by presenting a selected series of concrete legal impediments 
that victims may face in litigating at the Belgian level, as well as potential 
solutions to tackle them. 
The analysis will be structured in four sections, each addressing one 
specific, possible legal impediment. Firstly, the characterization of coloni-
al wrongs as war crimes will be examined, with a discussion on legal na-
ture of colonial conflicts under international humanitarian law (‘IHL’) and 
possible implications in terms of criminal prosecutions in Belgium (Sec-
tion 14.2.). Secondly, the chapter will address the non-application of statu-
tory limitations for international crimes and its contours in the Belgian 
experience (Section 14.3.). Thirdly, we will turn to the Belgian experience 
in establishing parliamentary commissions of inquiry on colonial wrongs, 
and the impact that such process may have in the context of criminal pro-
ceedings (Section 14.4.). Fourthly and finally, in light of recent legislative 
developments, the chapter will leave the domain of individual responsibil-
ity and turn to novel perspectives on the criminal liability of Belgium as a 
State (Section 14.5.). 
14.2. Prosecution for War Crimes and the Classification of Armed 
Conflicts 
From a legal perspective, the characterization of colonial wrongs as inter-
national crimes is of key importance to the efforts to bring those responsi-
ble to justice. This is because in many legal systems, the catalogue of in-
ternational crimes – whether war crimes, crimes against humanity or gen-
ocide – triggers the application of a series of derogatory tools (either pro-
cedural or substantive in nature) that are specific to this category of of-
fences. This includes the application of specific modes of liability,3 the 
ban on immunities,4 or, as will be further examined below,5 the applica-
tion of specific norms pertaining to statutory limitations. 
                                                   
3  See, for example, in the Belgian context, Article 136septies of the Criminal Code (for a 
commentary, see Damien Vandermeersch, “Les violations du droit international humani-
taire”, in Les infractions – Volume 5: les infractions contre l’ordre public, Brussels, Larcier, 
2013, pp. 140–145). 
4 See, for example, in the context of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’), 17 July 1998, Article 27 (‘ICC Statute’) (http://www.legaltools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
5 At Section 14.3. 
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Among international crimes, war crimes are the ones that have 
probably been most commonly associated with colonial, decolonization or 
post-colonial contexts. As Kaleck observes: “War crimes were a common 
feature of colonial wars”,6 also in the context of struggles of independ-
ence against Belgium. 7 This includes Congo (then Zaïre) in the early 
1960’s. 
On 17 January 1961, soon after the 30 June 1960 independence, 
Congo’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated in Ka-
tanga (which had recently seceded from the newly independent Congo), in 
the presence of both Belgian and Katangese officials.8 His corpse was dis-
solved in acid.9 Patrice Lumumba was known to have attracted strong op-
position from Belgian officials due to his highly critical position towards 
the former colonial State and its remaining interests in Congo.  
In 2001, a commission of inquiry10 was established within the Bel-
gian Parliament to elucidate the circumstances of this crime. In its final 
report, the commission came to the conclusion that “some members of the 
government of Belgium and other Belgian actors bear a moral responsibil-
ity in the circumstances that led to the death of Lumumba”.11  
Unsatisfied with this timid finding, in June 2011 the family of Pa-
trice Lumumba lodged a criminal complaint with a Brussels-based inves-
tigative judge, on grounds of the (Belgian) nationality12 of ten suspected 
participants to this crime.13 This complaint soon came to raise a debate on 
the precise characterization of the crime that had been committed against 
                                                   
6  Kaleck, p. 28, see above note 1. 
7  Ibid., p. 27. 
8  Enquête parlementaire visant à déterminer les circonstances exactes de l’assassinat de 
Patrice Lumumba et l’implication éventuelle des responsables politiques belges dans celui-
ci, Rapport, Doc. Parl., 2001-2002, no. 50-0312/007, pp. 838–839 in particular. 
9  Ibid., p. 824. 
10  On such mechanism in the Belgian context, see below at Section 14.4. 
11  Enquête parlementaire visant à déterminer les circonstances exactes de l’assassinat de 
Patrice Lumumba et l’implication éventuelle des responsables politiques belges dans celui-
ci, Rapport, Doc. Parl., 2001-2002, no. 50-0312/007, p. 839. Our own translation of “cer-
tains membres du gouvernement belge et d’autres acteurs belges ont une responsabilité 
morale dans les circonstances qui ont conduit à la mort de Lumumba”. 
12  Jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes in Belgium based on active nationality is 
consolidated in Article 6, 1 bis of the Preliminary Title to the Belgian Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Titre préliminaire du Code de procédure pénale). 
13  At the time of writing, only two of them were still alive. 
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Patrice Lumumba. Could his assassination indeed qualify as a war crime – 
especially in the specific forms of murder, torture or inhuman treatment, 
serious injury to body or health, other outrage upon personal dignity, dep-
rivation of the rights of fair and regular trial, and/or unlawful deportation 
or transfer? And, in the affirmative, should it be considered a war crime 
committed in an international or in a non-international armed conflict?  
While the classification between international and non-international 
armed conflicts has, on the face of it, limited significance in the Belgian 
criminal system (this is because the catalogue of war crimes enshrined 
since 199314 in Article 136quater of the Belgian Criminal Code consists 
of a list that is common to both international and non-international con-
flicts),15 the nature of the armed conflict that was ongoing at the time may 
still be relevant in connection with the requirements of legality and non-
retroactivity in criminal proceedings. This is because, under the latter 
principles, “a person may only be held criminally liable and punished if, 
at the moment when he performed a certain act, the act was regarded as a 
criminal offence by the relevant legal order”.16 
In the Lumumba case, the firm position of the family of Patrice Lu-
mumba was and still is that, in light of relevant IHL principles,17 the situa-
tion in Congo in January 1961 qualified as an international armed conflict 
(‘IAC’). In short, this is because Belgian troops were still present in Con-
go in January 1961, because Belgium was actively contributing to the se-
cessionist movements in both Katanga and Kasaï provinces, and because 
                                                   
14  Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des violations graves du droit international 
humanitaire, Belgian Official Journal (Moniteur belge), 5 August 1993. 
15  See, for example, Éric David, Éléments de droit pénal international et européen, second 
edition, Brussels, Bruylant, 2018, vol. 2, p. 1229. This certainly contrasts with what usual-
ly applies in other legal systems (see, for example, the duality of ICC Statute, Article 8, see 
above note 4). 
16  Antonio Cassese, “Nullum Crimen Sine Lege”, in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 438. 
17  See Article 2 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions as interpreted, for example, 
by International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Appeals chamber, Judgment, 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, para. 84 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/8efc3a/); ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant 
to Article 74 of the Statute, 18 March 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, para. 541 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/677866/). For a general commentary, see, for example, 
Andrew Clapham, “The Concept of International Armed Conflict”, in Andrew Clapham, 
Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds.), The 1949 Geneva Convention: A Commentary, Ox-
ford University Press, 2015, pp. 3–26.  
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United Nations (‘UN’) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (‘USSR’) 
troops were also involved on the ground at that time.18 As it is not serious-
ly disputable that war crimes committed during international armed con-
flicts were already reflected in customary international law at that time,19 
and because the legality principle under international law does not oppose 
the prosecution of international crimes based on their customary nature,20 
Patrice Lumumba’s complaint was, in our view, fully admissible. 
When this question was raised before the investigative section of 
the Brussels Court of Appeal (‘chambre des mises en accusation’), the 
perspective of the office of the federal prosecutor (‘parquet fédéral’) was 
slightly different. While agreeing that the murder of Patrice Lumumba 
could be characterized as a war crime and could lawfully lead to a crimi-
nal trial, the prosecutor considered that the situation in Congo, back in 
January 1961, did not consist of an international but of a non-international 
armed conflict (‘NIAC’). In turn, this alternative position raised the ques-
tion whether the criminalization of war crimes was already customary, 
back in 1961, also in time of non-international armed conflicts – which, 
according to the prosecutor, it was.21 
                                                   
18  See Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960-1964, Oxford 
University Press, 1978, especially pp. 7–47. 
19  See, already in 1949, Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, Article 49 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/baf8e7/); Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 
August 1949, Article 50 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0d0216/); Geneva Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, Article 129 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/365095/); Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the protec-
tion of civilian persons in time of war, 12 August 1949, Article 146 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/d5e260/). 
20  See, for example, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals chamber, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, IT-94-1-A, paras. 128–
129 (‘Tadic Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction’) 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/80x1an/); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Alagić 
and Kubura, Appeals chamber, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction 
in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, IT-01-47-AR72, paras. 35, 44–46 
and 55 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/608f09/). 
21  Brussels Court of Appeal (‘chambre des mises en accusation’) (‘BCA’), Prosecutor and 
Lumumba v. Huyghe et al., FD.30.99.10/11, Federal prosecutor’s submissions to the Brus-
sels Court of Appeal, 7 June 2012. 
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In its 12 December 2012 decision,22 the Brussels Court of Appeal, 
while not directly addressing the nature of the armed conflict at that time 
and place, concurred that, prima facie, the complaint and proceedings 
were admissible and had to carry on.  
This decision has been criticized – including in the media23 – by 
one commentator.24 According to the latter (who argued that the conflict 
in Congo was non-international at that time), “[i]t is only from the begin-
ning of the 1990’s that the concept of war crime has been extended to 
grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed in (…) non-
international armed conflicts”.25  
Surely, this statement must be nuanced.26 When, in the Tadić case, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) 
was called upon to decide that during the 1990’s ex-Yugoslavia war NI-
AC-based violations of IHL were already recognized as war crimes, the 
Tribunal also built on many pre-1990’s (and indeed pre-1960’s) declara-
tions, military handbooks and other materials suggesting ancient custom-
ary status, for example, in relation to the 1936-1939 Spanish civil war or 
to the 1947 civil war in China.27 
                                                   
22  BCA, Prosecutor and Lumumba v. Huyghe et al., FD.30.99.10/11, Interlocutory judgment 
n°. 4358, 12 December 2012. 
23  Pierre d’Huart, “Affaire Lumumba: “il n’y a pas eu crime de guerre””, La Libre Belgique, 
12 December 2012. 
24  Pierre d’Huart, “Affaire Lumumba: vers un non-lieu?”, in Journal des Tribunaux, no. 6517, 
2013, pp. 282–285. 
25  Ibid., p. 282 (our own translation of “[c]e n’est qu’à partir du début des années 1990 que la 
notion de crime de guerre s’est étendue aux violations graves du droit humanitaire com-
mises dans (…) les conflits armés non internationaux”). 
26  See, also of this view, Jacques B. Mbokani, “Le lien de connexité entre le crime et le con-
flit armé dans la définition des crimes de guerre”, in Diane Bernard and Damien Scalia 
(eds.), Vingt ans de justice internationale pénale, Les dossiers de la Revue de droit pénal et 
de criminologie, no. 21, La Charte, 2014, p. 44 (noting: “[t]he least we can say is that this 
statement comes as a surprise. Even more surprising is that [the author] cites Eric David 
and Antonio Cassese, although this is not what these eminent professors meant to say in 
the excerpts that the author refers to”; our own translation of “[l]e moins qu’on puisse dire, 
est que cette affirmation étonne. Plus étonnant encore, c’est qu’il cite à son appui Eric Da-
vid et Antonio Cassese, alors que ce n’est pas ce que ces éminents professeurs ont voulu 
dire dans les passages auxquels l’auteur se réfère”). 
27  Tadic Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, paras. 100–
102 in particular, see above note 20. 
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In fact, it very much seems that no international or internationalized 
criminal body has ever had the chance to question whether, in the early 
1960’s, grave breaches of IHL committed in time of NIAC could already 
qualify as war crimes under customary international law. In the context of 
the prima facie assessment that it was called upon to conduct on 12 De-
cember 2012, the Brussels Court of Appeal suggested that they could. In 
the view of Patrice Lumumba’s family, this is an important step in filling 
the accountability gap for colonial wrongs. 
14.3. The Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations for 
International Crimes 
The existence of statutory limitations is a recurring question in efforts to 
tackle impunity for international crimes. This is certainly true of colonial 
crimes, which tend to be brought to justice several decades after they were 
committed – if ever indeed. This is yet another challenge in the Lumumba 
case that deserves some attention.  
It is not disputed that, in the Belgian (written) legislative framework, 
both the existence of war crimes and the suppression of statutes of limita-
tion for their prosecution are the result of a 1993 piece of legislation that 
entered into force on 15 August 1993.28 As a result of this legislation, and 
despite its subsequent, profound amendment (especially in 2003),29 Arti-
cle 21 of the Preliminary Title to the Belgian Code of Criminal Proce-
dure30 provides that the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against human-
ity and genocide in Belgium cannot become time-barred. The possible 
challenge with respect to this provision, as we shall see below, pertains to 
its ratione temporis scope. 
It should first be recalled that Belgium is far from being isolated on 
the exclusion of statutory limitations for international crimes. On the in-
ternational level, important steps have been taken in this direction, espe-
cially with a view to preventing impunity for World War II crimes.31 On 
26 November 1968, the Convention on the non-applicability of statutory 
                                                   
28  Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des violations graves du droit international 
humanitaire, Belgian Official Journal (Moniteur belge), 5 August 1993. 
29  Loi du 5 août 2003 relative aux violations graves du droit international humanitaire, Bel-
gian Official Journal (Moniteur belge), 7 August 2003. 
30  Titre préliminaire du Code de procédure pénale (“Preliminary Title”). 
31  See Florence Bellivier, Marine Eudes and Isabelle Fouchard, Droit des crimes internatio-
naux, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2018, p. 351. 
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limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity was adopted under 
the auspices of the UN.32 A similar initiative was replicated a few years 
after that within the Council of Europe, with the adoption in 1974 of the 
Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitation to crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.33 Although it is true that neither of the-
se instruments gained much support (Belgium still became a party to the 
1974 Council of Europe Convention in 2003), many legislators decided to 
go along and to adopt ‘imprescriptibility’ clauses for international crimes. 
This is how Article 21 of the Preliminary Title to the Belgian Code of 
Criminal Procedure came into existence – along with, for example, Article 
213-5 of the French criminal code34 and Article 29 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.35  
The ratione temporis scope of this provision, which entered into 
force on 15 August 1993, must then be questioned. Does it apply to all 
crimes, whenever committed and whether or not they would have normal-
ly become time-barred before 15 August 1993? Does it apply to past 
crimes, but only insofar as they had not reached statutory limitation by 15 
August 1993? Or does it apply to crimes committed after 15 August 1993 
only? In other words, can Article 21 of the Preliminary Title be applied in 
relation to the assassination of Patrice Lumumba – a crime for which, if it 
were not for Article 21, the statutory limitation would have normally ex-
pired after 10 years under Belgian law as it applied at that time?36 
The international and comparative experience reveals important dif-
ferences in approach on this issue. To only mention one obvious contrast 
                                                   
32  United Nations, Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 11 November 1970, Treaty Series, vol. 754, p. 73 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4bd593/). 
33  Council of Europe, European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation 
to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 27 June 2003, ETS No. 082 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/302b1c/). 
34  This provision, which was introduced pursuant to a law no. 64-1326 of 26 December 1964, 
provides for the non-applicability of statutory limitation to crimes against humanity and 
genocide. War crimes, on the other hand, may still become time-barred after 30 years un-
der Article 462-10 of the French Criminal Code (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/418004/). 
35  “The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limi-
tations”. 
36  Loi du 17 avril 1878 contenant le titre préliminaire du Code de procédure pénale, telle que 
modifiée par la loi du 30 mai 1961, Belgian Official Journal (Moniteur belge), 10 June 
1961, Article 21. 
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at treaty level: while the 1968 UN Convention applies to all crimes “irre-
spective of the date of their commission” (Article 1), the 1974 European 
Convention is limited to crimes “committed after its entry into force” or 
“committed before such entry into force in those cases where the statutory 
limitation period had not expired at that time” (Article 2). The question, in 
short, is thus whether Article 21 of the Preliminary Title should be inter-
preted in accordance with the UN or European conventional model. 
Under common principles of Belgian judicial law and practice, 
when norms of a procedural character are newly adopted, they normally 
apply immediately to all new situations, but also to all continuing effects 
of situations that arose prior to the legislative amendment in question.37 
Theoretically, this would seem to suggest that, insofar as it entered the 
Belgian legislative framework on 15 August 1993, the ban on statutory 
limitations for international crimes should normally apply to crimes 
committed after 1993, to older crimes for which the statutory limitation 
had not been reached by 15 August 1993, but – prima facie – not to 
crimes which had already become time-barred by that date. As far as ordi-
nary crimes are concerned, this position has been confirmed in Belgium 
both by the Cour de cassation and by the Cour constitutionnelle.38 
This general position, however, may not be in line with internation-
al and comparative practice as far as international crimes are specifically 
concerned. As other precedents indicate, and although human rights prac-
tice seems to generally echo the general solution described above,39 sev-
                                                   
37  Article 2 and 3 of the Belgian Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by consistent case 
law (see, for example, Cour de cassation, 24 April 2008, Pasicrisie, 2008, p. 993; for many 
further references, see Franklin Kuty, Principes généraux du droit pénal belge – Tome 1: la 
loi pénale, third edition, Brussels, Larcier, 2018, p. 294). 
38  Cour de cassation, 12 November 1996, no. P.95.1171.N (available at www.juridat.be); 
Cour constitutionnelle, 4 April 2019, no. 54/2019, Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 
2019, no. 6, pp. 824–828. 
39  Though the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) clearly accepts the extension of a 
limitation period before its expiry (ECtHR, Coëme and others v. Belgium, Judgment, 22 
June 2000, no. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96, para. 149 (‘ECtHR 
Coëme v. Belgium’) (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0f1fd3/)), the Court seems more 
careful and less consistent when it comes to “restoring the possibility of punishing offend-
ers for acts which were no longer punishable because they had already become subject to 
limitation”. Compare ECtHR, Kononov v. Latvia, Judgment, 24 July 2008, application no. 
36376/04, para. 144 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/56dc40/); ECtHR, Kononov v. Latvia, 
Grand Chamber, Judgment, 17 May 2010, application no. 36376/04, paras. 228–233 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ed0506/); ECtHR Coëme v. Belgium, para. 149. 
 
Colonial Wrongs and Access to International Law 
Publication Series No. 40 (2020) – page 420 
eral arguments have been successfully put forward in judicial history to 
support the assertion that this general model does not apply, as such, to 
prosecution for international crimes.40  
When faced with similar challenges, the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’), for instance, have decided that the 
principles of legality and non-retroactivity do not apply at all to limitation 
periods and to other procedural matters, but only to purely substantive 
issues.41 Another chamber within the ECCC further suggested that, in any 
case, limitation periods do not run for the time during which the State’s 
prosecutorial and investigative machinery has not been functioning 
properly.42  
In our view, however, the most convincing argument rests with gen-
eral international law – especially in the form of custom.43 This has been 
the French Court de cassation’s approach in the Barbie case, when it de-
cided that the non-applicability of statutory limitation for crimes against 
humanity was not only the result of Article 213-5 of the French Criminal 
Code (mentioned above), but that it also stemmed from a pre-existing 
norm of international law – as such, there was thus no retroactivity and 
the principle merely confirmed by Article 213-5 could rightfully apply to 
the crimes committed by Claus Barbie during World War II.44  
In the Lumumba case, neither the office of the federal prosecutor 
nor the Brussels Court of Appeal raised the ratione temporis scope of Ar-
ticle 21 of the Preliminary Title to the Belgian Code of Criminal Proce-
                                                   
40  On the non-applicability of statutory limitations in light of the specific nature of interna-
tional crimes, see Yasmin Q. Naqvi, Impediments to Exercising Jurisdiction over Interna-
tional Crimes, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010, pp. 211–214. 
41  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’), Prosecutor v. NUON Chea 
et al., Pre-Trial Chamber, 15 February 2011, no. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 145 
and 146) D427/2/15, para. 183 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/592afb/). Also of this view, 
see Claus Kreß, “Nullum poena nullum crimen sine lege”, in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed.), The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, pa-
ra. 20 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f9b453/). 
42  ECCC, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav (Duch), Trial Chamber, Decision on the defence 
preliminary objection concerning the statute of limitations of domestic crimes, 26 July 
2010, no. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC (E187), para. 14 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/2466c7/). 
43  For a detailed analysis on the notion that customary international law precludes the use of 
statutes of limitation over international crimes, see Naqvi, 2010, pp. 192–209, see above 
note 40. 
44  French Cour de cassation (crim.), 26 January 1984, no. 83-94.425. 
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dure as a possible impediment to the admissibility of the criminal prose-
cution initiated by Patrice Lumumba’s family. The prosecutor observed 
that “under Article 21, para. 1, of the Preliminary Title to the Belgian 
Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal prosecution for [international 
crimes] cannot become time-barred”,45 and the court concurred that “the 
Belgian [trial] judge might indeed be competent over these facts [which] 
cannot become time-barred under Article 21, paragraph 1, of the law of 17 
April 1878 containing the Preliminary Title to the Belgian Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure”.46 
This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first and only court deci-
sion in Belgian judicial history in relation to this issue. In 1999, however, 
a Belgian investigating judge called upon to investigate crimes committed 
by Augusto Pinochet had already decided as follows: “it must be conclud-
ed that there exists a customary norm of international law establishing the 
non-applicability of statutory limitations for crimes against humanity and 
that this norm is applicable in the domestic legal order”.47 The 12 Decem-
ber 2012 Court of Appeal decision in the Lumumba case strongly sug-
gests – as does the latter investigating judge’s order and as other domestic 
courts have also done before – that the ban on statutory limitations for 
serious colonial crimes also applies to any past offence, as this principle 
not only results from the relevant legislative framework in Belgium, but 
also, has some superior roots in the international legal order. 
14.4. The Establishment of Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry 
and Possible Implications on Criminal Proceedings 
On 9 December 1999, a proposition to establish a Parliamentary Commis-
sion of inquiry in charge of determining the exact circumstances of the 
                                                   
45  Prosecutor and Lumumba v. Huyghe et al., FD.30.99.10/11, Federal prosecutor’s submis-
sions to the Brussels Court of Appeal, 7 June 2012 (our own translation of “conformément 
à l’article 21 § 1ier du titre préliminaire du code d’instruction criminelle, l’action publique 
relative à des [crimes internationaux] ne peut être prescrite”). 
46  Prosecutor and Lumumba v. Huyghe et al., FD.30.99.10/11, Brussels Court of Appeal 
(chambre des mises en accusation), Interlocutory judgment no. 4358, 12 December 2012 
(our own translation of “le juge belge pourrait en effet (…) être compétent pour connaître 
de ces faits [qui] sont imprescriptibles en application de l’article 21, paragraphe 1er, de la 
loi du 17 avril 1878 contenant le titre préliminaire du Code d’instruction criminelle”).  
47  Brussels Investigating Judge, 6 November 1998, Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 
1999, p. 289 (our own translation of “il y a lieu de conclure à l’existence d’une règle cou-
tumière de droit international consacrant l’imprescriptibilité des crimes contre l’humanité 
et que cette règle est applicable en droit interne”). 
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assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the possible involvement of Bel-
gian politicians was submitted to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. 
On 2 February 2000, the establishment of the said commission was ap-
proved and eventually, on 16 November 2001, a report of almost one 
thousand pages regarding the parliamentary inquiry was published.48 As 
mentioned above,49 this commission came to the timid conclusion that 
“some members of the government of Belgium and other Belgian actors 
bear a moral responsibility in the circumstances that led to the death of 
Lumumba”. The implications of this parliamentary commission of en-
quiry on the ongoing criminal proceedings regarding the assassination of 
Lumumba in Belgium have not yet come to light. However, some proce-
dural concerns may already be raised based on the Belgium Transnuklear 
case (see below). 
By virtue of Article 56 of the Belgian Constitution and the law of 3 
May 1880 on parliamentary inquiries (‘the law of 3 May 1880’), the 
Chamber of Representatives and the Senate50 may establish commissions 
of inquiry. A member of Parliament can request that an inquiry be held. 
This request is handled in the same manner as a bill. After a debate in 
committee, the request goes to the plenary meeting for discussion and vot-
ing. If the request is approved, the branch of Parliament in which the re-
quest was made must appoint the commission of inquiry, upon which the 
investigation can proceed. According to the law of 3 May 1880, the in-
quiry may be held by the Chamber or the Senate in plenary or by a special 
commission. In practice, a special commission always conducts inquiries. 
The commission of inquiry and its chairperson hold the same powers as 
an investigating judge. This means that they can, amongst other things, 
call on and hear witnesses and experts. For some investigative measures 
such as a restriction of the freedom of movement, a seizure of material 
goods, a house search, perception and recording of private communication 
and telecommunication, a judge has to be appointed under the law of 3 
May 1880.51 Upon completion of the inquiry, the rapporteur designated by 
the commission gives an account of the results of the inquiry to the plena-
                                                   
48  Enquête parlementaire visant à déterminer les circonstances exactes de l’assassinat de 
Patrice Lumumba et l’implication éventuelle des responsables politiques belges dans celui-
ci, Rapport, Doc. Parl., 2001-2002, no. 50-0312/006 and no. 50-0312/007. 
49  See above at Section 14.2. 
50  These are the two branches of the Belgian Parliament. 
51  Article 4, para. 4, of the law of 3 May 1880. 
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ry session. The plenary examines the report and makes a statement about 
the possible conclusions, recommendations or resolutions of the commis-
sion of inquiry.52 
An inquiry initiated by the Chamber of Representatives or the Sen-
ate does not replace possible investigations by the judiciary. The law of 3 
May 1880 provides that in case a parliamentary inquiry coexists with a 
judicial investigation, the parliamentary inquiry must not hinder the 
course of the judicial investigation.53 
Belgium has an ancient practice of establishing parliamentary 
commissions of inquiry in relation to sensitive issues such as colonial 
matters.54 In the past, the power of inquiry was used primarily for legisla-
tive initiatives that should allow a more efficient functioning of the legis-
lative bodies and lead to legislative initiatives. Over the years, parliamen-
tary commissions of inquiry have been used in response to certain heavily, 
emotionally charged files, such as the Parliamentary commission of in-
quiry into the events in Rwanda,55 the Parliamentary commission investi-
gating the legal and illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources in 
the Great Lakes region in view of the current conflict situation and Bel-
gium’s involvement,56 the parliamentary commission of inquiry to investi-
gate the murder of Patrice Lumumba and possible Belgian responsibilities, 
and, more recently, the more comprehensive and newly-established par-
liamentary commission on Belgium’s colonial past.57  
                                                   
52  The mechanism of parliamentary commissions of enquiry as explained by the Belgian 
Senate. Belgian Senate, “Parliamentary committees of inquiry” (available on its web site). 
53  Article 1 of the law of 3 May 1880. 
54  See, for example, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Commission parlementaire, 
chargée de faire une enquête sur les événements qui se sont produits à Léopoldville en jan-
vier 1959, 27 March 1959, 1958-1959, no. 3. 
55  Sénat de Belgique, Commission d’enquête parlementaire concernant les événements du 
Rwanda, 6 December 1997, 1997–1998, no. 1-611/7. 
56  Sénat de Belgique, Commission d’enquête parlementaire chargée d’enquêter sur 
l’exploitation et le commerce légaux et illégaux de richesses naturelles dans la région des 
Grands Lacs au vu de la situation conflictuelle actuelle et de l’implication de la Belgique, 
20 February 2003, 2002-2003, no. 2-942/1.  
57  Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Commission spéciale chargée d’examiner  
l’état indépendant du Congo (1885-1908) et le passé colonial de la Belgique au Congo 
(1908-1960), au Rwanda et au Burundi (1919-1962), ses conséquences et les suites qu’il 
convient d’y réserver, 17 juillet 2020, 2019–2020, no. 55-1462/001. 
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The Belgian practice of establishing parliamentary inquires raises 
some concerns which may hinder effective and fair criminal proceedings, 
and which might contribute to fostering an accountability gap.  
Procedural issues and tension between a parliamentary inquiry and 
a judicial investigation – when both are investigating the same matter at 
the same time – were illustrated in the Belgian Transnuklear case. This 
case concerned two industrialists who were suspected of having made 
profit out of scams with hazardous nuclear waste. The two industrialists 
were eventually acquitted by the Antwerp Court of Appeal in May 1993 
because of a serious violation of their right to a fair trial, which led ac-
cording to the Court of Appeal to the inadmissibility of the criminal pro-
ceedings. This decision was based on the fact that the two industrialists 
had in fact been obliged to make confessions under oath before a parlia-
mentary commission of inquiry and that, afterwards, an investigating 
judge had built on those statements made under oath to further interrogate 
the two industrialists. The Court considered that questioning under oath 
persons who are subject to a criminal investigation on facts that are the 
object of the criminal investigation is a clear violation of defence rights, if 
the statements made before the commission of inquiry are then used to 
incriminate the concerned persons in the context of the criminal investiga-
tion.58 
The question must therefore be raised whether the practice of par-
liamentary commissions of inquiry may lead to an accountability gap in 
the sense that the defence can rely on this case law to evade criminal re-
sponsibility in case information from parliamentary commissions of in-
quiry are subsequently used in criminal proceedings.  
After this judicial precedent, the law of 3 May 1880 has been modi-
fied by a law of 30 June 1996 amending the law of 3 May 1880 on par-
liamentary inquiries and Article 458 of the Criminal Code.59 Article 8 of 
the law of 3 May 1880 now provides that “he who is summoned to be 
heard as a witness is obliged to appear and to comply with the summons, 
under penalty of imprisonment of eight days to six months and a fine of 
five hundred francs to ten thousand francs”, but that the professional se-
crecy referred to in Article 458 of the Belgian Criminal Code can be in-
                                                   
58  See also Cour de cassation, 6 May 1993, Pasicrisie, 1993, I, no. 225.  
59  Loi du 30 juin 1996 modifiant la loi du 3 mai 1880 sur les enquêtes parlementaires et 
l’article 458 du Code pénal, Belgian Official Journal (Moniteur belge), 16 July 1996. 
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voked, and that any witness may invoke the fact that, by making a truthful 
statement, he could expose himself to criminal prosecution and therefore 
will refuse to testify.60 However, a refusal to answer during a parliamen-
tary inquiry based on the fact that the concerned person could expose him- 
or herself to criminal prosecution, could raise a negative suspicion and 
could still lead to the public prosecutor pressing an investigation. It has 
been advocated61 that the possibility of having parallel parliamentary in-
quiries and criminal investigation on the same facts, should be made im-
possible in Belgian law.  
The legislative amendment after the Transnuklear case does not, in 
our opinion, address all the possible procedural impediments that could be 
thought of regarding the correlation between Belgian parliamentary in-
quiries and criminal investigations.  
It is not clearly established by current Belgian legislation, for in-
stance, whether information considered as confidential during a parlia-
mentary commission of inquiry62 may be used in a criminal proceeding if 
                                                   
60  Under the French, original version of Article 8 of the law of 3 May 1880:  
Toute personne autre qu’un membre de la Chambre qui, à un titre quelconque, assiste 
ou participe aux réunions non publiques de la commission, est tenue, préalablement, de 
prêter le serment de respecter le secret des travaux. Toute violation de ce secret sera 
punie conformément aux dispositions de l’article 458 du Code pénal. 
Les témoins, les interprètes et les experts sont soumis devant la Chambre, la com-
mission ou le magistrat commis, aux mêmes obligations que devant le juge 
d’instruction. 
Tout un chacun peut être appelé comme témoin. La convocation se fait par écrit et, 
au besoin, par citation. […] 
Les témoins et les experts prêtent ensuite le serment de dire toute la vérité et rien 
que la vérité. […] 
Toute personne citée pour être entendue en témoignage sera tenue de comparaître 
et de satisfaire à la citation sous peine d’un emprisonnement de huit jours à six mois et 
d’une amende de cinq cents francs à dix mille francs. Les dispositions du livre I du 
Code pénal, sans exception du chapitre VII et de l’article 85, sont applicables. 
Sans préjudice de l’invocation du secret professionnel visé à l’article 458 du Code 
pénal, tout témoin qui, en faisant une déclaration conforme à la vérité, pourrait 
s’exposer à des poursuites pénales, peut refuser de témoigner. 
61  For example, by Jacques Velu, Attorney General at the Cour de cassation, during the sol-
emn opening session of the Court on 1 September 1993. 
62  Article 3, para. 4, of the law of 3 May 1880 provides that:  
Les membres de la Chambre sont tenus au secret en ce qui concerne les informations 
recueillies à l'occasion des réunions non publiques de la commission. Toute violation 
de ce secret sera sanctionnée conformément au règlement de la Chambre […]. 
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necessary for the establishment of the truth, whether declarations made 
under oath during a parliamentary commission of inquiry can be subjected 
in some situations to an adversarial debate in order to protect the equality 
of arms during the criminal proceedings, whether the outcome of such 
commissions might lead to situations where the ne bis in idem principle 
would or could be raised by the defendant, etc. 
Other questionable consequences of parliamentary inquiries on 
criminal proceedings could include possible leaks of information from the 
parliamentary inquiry63 that would be detrimental to the (necessary) se-
crecy of criminal investigations, and the obligation of undergoing ques-
tioning under oath during a parliamentary inquiry which is not always 
compatible with the right to remain silent. 
On the other hand, the law of 3 May 1880 does not provide specific 
guarantees pertaining to effective legal assistance during the parliamen-
tary inquiry, regarding questions such as access to the case file and equali-
ty of arms. Not only do parliamentary commissions raise concerns regard-
ing the rights of the concerned persons during the inquiry, but also regard-
ing the consequences of the parliamentary inquiry on any parallel judicial 
investigations. 
As the Transnuklear case has shown, establishing parliamentary 
commissions of inquiry may arguably, paradoxically, reinforce the ac-
countability gap. In case a parliamentary inquiry and a judicial investiga-
tion are ongoing at the same time or relate to the same facts, the practice 
of parliamentary inquiry commissions in Belgium may result in judicial 
investigations not having any effect or might raise some risks as to the 
(in)admissibility of criminal proceedings,64 as a result of remaining gaps 
in Belgian legislation regarding procedural rights during parliamentary 
inquiry and criminal proceedings. 
14.5. The Criminal Liability of Belgium as a State 
On 30 July 2018, the law of 11 July 2018 amending the Criminal Code 
and the Preliminary Title of the Code of Criminal Procedure as regards 
                                                                                                                        
La commission peut lever l'obligation de secret sauf si elle s'est expressément en-
gagée à le préserver. 
63  Despite the above-mentioned provision of Article 3 of the law of 3 May 1880.  
64  Like it was the case in the Transnuklear case.  
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the criminal liability of legal persons entered into force in Belgium.65 The 
most significant changes implemented by this legislation concern the 
alignment of the criminal regime for legal and individual persons, making 
both liable for any criminal offense to which they contributed, and the 
abrogation of the criminal immunity of legal entities governed by public 
law. 
Since July 2018, legal entities governed by public law can thus be 
held criminally responsible for offenses committed in their name or on 
their behalf. With respect to this specific category of legal persons, how-
ever, only a simple declaration of guilt can be pronounced, in accordance 
with the amendment of Article 7bis of the Belgian Criminal Code.66  
Prior to this legislative reform, Article 5 of the Belgian Criminal 
Code excluded certain legal entities governed by public law from its 
scope, namely: the Belgian federal State, the regions, the communities, 
the provinces, rescue zones, pre-zones, agglomeration of Brussels, munic-
ipalities, multiple municipality zones, intra-municipal territorial bodies, 
the French Community Commission, the Flemish Community Commis-
sion, the Common Community Commission, the public social welfare 
centres, associations without legal form and non-profit organizations in 
the course of incorporation. Some of these legal entities of public law had 
been until then qualified as political, given that they have an organ direct-
ly elected according to democratic rules. They therefore enjoyed criminal 
immunity. 
The new law of July 2018 can be considered a small but important 
step towards covering certain existing accountability gaps regarding the 
criminal responsibility of the Belgian State – including, possibly, for co-
lonial wrongs –, in two ways in particular. 
                                                   
65  Loi du 11 juillet 2018 modifiant le Code pénal et le titre préliminaire du Code de procé-
dure pénale en ce qui concerne la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales, Belgian Of-
ficial Journal (Moniteur belge), 20 July 2018. 
66  Article 7bis, last paragraph, of the Belgian Criminal Code provides that: “En ce qui con-
cerne l'Etat fédéral, les Régions, les Communautés, les provinces, les zones de secours, les 
prézones, l’Agglomération bruxelloise, les communes, les zones pluricommunales, les or-
ganes territoriaux intracommunaux, la Commission communautaire française, la Commis-
sion communautaire flamande, la Commission communautaire commune et les centres pu-
blics d’aide sociale seule la simple déclaration de culpabilité peut être prononcée, à 
l’exclusion de toute autre peine”. 
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Firstly, the new legal regime provides for the possible coexistence 
of criminal liability for both natural and legal persons. Prior to the legisla-
tive amendment, Article 5 of the Belgian Criminal Code did not provide 
systematically that a natural person and a legal person could be convicted 
at the same time. When the legal person’s liability was incurred due to the 
intervention of a natural person exclusively, only the one person (either 
the natural or the legal person) who had committed the most serious of-
fence could be held criminally responsible. Article 5 of the Belgian Crim-
inal Code thus previously provided for an exoneration of responsibility 
for the person who had committed the least serious fault (this was unless 
the offence was committed “knowingly and intentionally”; in such a case, 
coexistence of criminal liability remained possible). Since 30 July 2018, 
this principle of non-concurring liability has been abolished. Article 5 of 
the Belgian Criminal Code now stipulates that “the criminal liability of 
legal persons does not exclude that of natural persons who have commit-
ted or participated in the same acts”. The general rules on liability and 
participation in criminal offences as provided in Article 66 et seq. of the 
Belgian Criminal Code now apply in those situations.67 
Secondly, the law of 11 July 2018 introduced a form of criminal li-
ability for legal persons governed by public law. The Belgian State and its 
many decentralized entities – such as the regions, the communities, the 
provinces, and the Brussels agglomeration – are now considered as legal 
persons who may be criminally liable. This means that the law now al-
lows victims to file a criminal complaint in Belgium, against the Belgian 
State, including for colonial wrongs. 
Despite these two amendments, we have to note that with respect to 
legal entities governed by public law, such as the Belgian State, only a 
penalty consisting of a “mere declaration of guilt” may be imposed pursu-
ant to Article 7bis, paragraph 3, of the Belgian Criminal Code. Other pen-
alties existing for natural persons as well as other legal persons (such as 
fines, confiscation, dissolution, and prohibition from practicing) are ex-
plicitly excluded by the Belgian Criminal Code for legal entities governed 
by public law. In the context of colonial wrongs, this may be problematic 
for achieving an effective reparation for victims before a criminal court. 
Measures which plaintiffs may expect to be taken by a State who is con-
                                                   
67  “La responsabilité pénale des personnes morales n’exclut pas celle des personnes phy-
siques auteurs des mêmes faits ou y ayant participé.” 
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sidered criminally responsible for a colonial wrong usually do not only 
consist in a mere declaration of guilt, but may also consist in taking steps 
to prevent a recurrence of the colonial wrongdoing, the payment of com-
pensation for the caused loss, the restitution of colonial objects, etc. Vic-
tims could, however, consider trying to obtain some of these measures 
through civil proceedings subsequent to a criminal declaration of guilt. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether a ‘mere declaration of guilt’ can 
be considered as an effective criminal sentence given that it is neither 
privative nor restrictive of freedom, of private property or of any other 
right. 
At last, pursuant to Article 2 of the Belgian Criminal Code, no 
crimes can be punished with penalties that were not prescribed by law at 
the time when the crime was committed. In addition, if the penalty deter-
mined at the time of the judgment differs from that determined at the time 
of the crime, the least severe penalty will be applied.68 Article 2 of the 
Belgian Criminal Code prohibits the retroactive application of criminal 
law when it is to an accused’s disadvantage. The principle of non-
retroactivity of criminal law69 applies both to the provisions defining the 
offence and to those setting the penalties incurred. Bearing these princi-
ples in mind, the law of 11 July 2018, which entered into force on 30 July 
2018, will only apply to crimes committed after that date. Criminal liabil-
ity of the Belgian State can thus only exist for criminal offences commit-
ted after the date of the entry into force of the new law. This means that an 
accountability gap in relation to the criminal liability of the Belgian State 
still exists for any colonial wrongs committed before 30 July 2018 (which 
certainly applies to a big part of colonial wrongdoing) given that the old 
rules continue to govern this period. The Belgian State thus continues to 
enjoy criminal immunity for any colonial or post-colonial wrongs com-
mitted prior to 30 July 2018. The future will tell if arguments can be 
raised successfully before courts with a view to countering this accounta-
bility gap, as has been the case in relation to the non-applicability of statu-
tory limitations for international crimes.70 
                                                   
68  See also above at Section 14.1. 
69  Also embodied in Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, 4 Novem-
ber 1950, Article 7 (https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8267cb/), and UN, International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 March 1976, Article 15 (https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/2838f3/). 
70  See also above at Section 14.3. 
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14.6. Conclusion 
There is still a long way to effective justice for colonial crimes within the 
Belgian legal system. As exposed above, different impediments might still 
be faced by victims in their quest for accountability. Also important are 
the procedural questions regarding the correlation between Belgian par-
liamentary inquiries and criminal investigations discussed above.  
A potential recommendation to tackle impediments mentioned ear-
lier in the chapter, with a view to countering existing accountability gaps, 
would relate to the difficulties concerning the ratione temporis scope of 
different mechanisms in the context of colonial wrongs. Given the fact 
that most of the cases concerning colonial crimes tend to be brought to 
justice several decades after they were committed, it could be envisaged 
by the Belgian legislator to provide specific regulations with a view to 
duly addressing the temporal impediments and to better taking into ac-
count the particular historical and practical reasons which often place vic-
tims of colonial wrongs in an uneasy position to seek justice after several 
years or decades have lapsed. 
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